Labour market outcomes and Egypt's migration potential by AMER, Mona & FARGUES, Philippe
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2014/55 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Migration Policy Centre 
Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt’s Migration 
Potential 
 
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Migration Policy Centre 
 
 
 
Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt’s Migration Potential 
 
  
 
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/55 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues, 2014 
Printed in Italy, May 2014 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid 
Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Migration Policy Centre (MPC)  
The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced 
research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, 
implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider 
economy and society. 
The MPC carries out field as well as archival research, both of which are scientifically robust and 
policy-relevant, not only at European level, but also globally, targeting policy-makers as well as 
politicians. This research provides tools for addressing migration challenges, by: 1) producing policy-
oriented research on aspects of migration, asylum and mobility in Europe and in countries located 
along migration routes to Europe, that are regarded as priorities; 2) bridging research with action by 
providing policy-makers and other stakeholders with results required by evidence-based 
policymaking, as well as necessary methodologies that address migration governance needs; 3) 
pooling scholars, experts, policy makers, and influential thinkers in order to identify problems, 
research their causes and consequences, and devise policy solutions. Our research includes a core 
programme and several projects, most of them co-financed by the European Union. 
The MPC working paper series, published since April 2013, aims at disseminating high-quality 
research pertaining to migration and related issues. All EUI members, as well as other external 
scholars and practitioners, are welcome to submit their work to the series. For further queries, please 
contact the Migration Policy Centre Secretariat at mpc@eui.eu 
More information can be found on: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/ 
Disclaimer: The EUI, RSCAS and MPC are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
Furthermore, the views expressed in this publication cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the 
official position of the European Union”. 
 
  
Abstract 
Will the radical political changes Egypt has gone through since early 2011 have an impact on 
emigration from the country? This all depends on young Egyptian adults, who are the potential 
migrants of tomorrow. In order to understand the consequences of the Egyptian revolution might for 
migration, a questionnaire survey was conducted amongst Egyptian youth in 2013. The objective of 
this paper is to analyse the Egyptian labour market together with Egyptian migration to see whether 
changing conditions in the labour market, in particular after the revolution of 25 January 2011, may 
affect migration. This study is divided into three parts. The first analyses recent trends – from 2007 to 
2011 – of the labour market and in particular the evolution of the labour force in terms of participation 
rate and unemployment rate according to gender, age group and educational level. The second part 
outlines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Egyptian migrants, in general, and 
according to region of migration (Gulf Cooperation Countries and other Arab countries as opposed to 
OECD countries). It also presents an analysis of unemployment against the education and skill levels 
of Egyptian migrants. Finally, the last part presents the findings of a survey on orientation towards 
migration of Egyptian youth. This survey was designed by the Migration Policy Centre and was 
conducted through phone interviews by the Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) in 
2013.  
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Introduction* 
Will the radical political changes Egypt has gone through since early 2011 have an impact on 
emigration from the country? This all depends on young Egyptian adults, who are the potential 
migrants of tomorrow. In order to understand the consequences of the Egyptian revolution might for 
migration, a questionnaire survey was conducted amongst Egyptian youth in January 2013. 
Emigration is a salient feature of contemporary Egypt, playing a critical role in the Egyptian 
economy and society. Around 10% of Egyptian households have at least one current or former 
expatriate member or close relative so that a culture of emigration has emerged throughout the 
country: as many young people are exposed to the emigration of relatives or friends, or hear about 
emigration through individual, family or community ties, they come to see emigration as a realistic 
option for themselves.  
At the local and national levels, emigration presents an enormous economic opportunity for 
Egyptian families, communities and, to a certain extent, for the State. Over the past two decades, 
Egyptians had sent on average between $5 billion and $10 billion in annual remittances. In 2010 and 
2011 alone, the amount increased as Egyptians remitted respectively over $12 billion and $14 billion 
(or 3% of GDP in 2010),
1
 continuing to make labour migration the leading source of the foreign 
currencies pumped into the Egyptian economy. The importance that the Egyptian authorities give to 
emigration is demonstrated by the permanence of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration created 
under President Mubarak and renewed by the post-revolution government, with an unchanged 
mandate for facilitating the employment of Egyptian nationals on external labour markets and for 
liaising with Egyptian expatriates. 
The objective of this study is to analyse the Egyptian labour market together with Egyptian 
migration to see whether changing conditions in the labour market, in particular after the revolution, 
25 January 2011, may affect migration. This study is divided into three parts. The first analyses recent 
trends – from 2007 to 2011 – of the labour market and in particular the evolution of the labour force in 
terms of participation rate and unemployment rate according to gender, age group and educational 
level. The second part outlines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Egyptian 
migrants, in general, and according to region of migration (Gulf Cooperation Countries and other Arab 
countries as opposed to OECD countries). It also presents an analysis of unemployment against the 
education and skill levels of Egyptian migrants. Finally, the last part presents the findings of a Survey 
on Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth. This survey was designed by the Migration 
Policy Centre and was conducted through phone interviews by the Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion 
Research (Baseera) in January 2013.  
1. Evolution of the Egyptian Labour Market  
Demographic Trend and Labour Force Population 
The Egyptian population has grown strongly since the 1950s. According to the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) the population rose from 21.5 million in 1950 to nearly 
84 million in 2013. And population growth will continue to be a major concern. Indeed, according to 
                                                     
*
 This report is co-published by the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute and the Center for 
Migration and Refugee Studies at the American University in Cairo. 
1
 World Bank. Annual remittances data: inflows. Retrieved from 
 http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:
64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html  
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Figure 1 and assuming the medium variant of the United Nations, Egypt’s population will continue to 
increase to 133 million by 2060. It will stabilise until 2085 and then will decline until 2100.  
Figure 1: Total Population by variant and by Age Group, 1950-2100  
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York 
Over the very long term the population growth rate follows a downward trend. As shown in Figure 2, 
the average annual growth of the population decreases from 2.5% in 1950-1955 to 0.5% in 2045-2050. 
However, this downward trend is not smooth. During certain periods population growth has 
accelerated, especially in the 1970s and early 2000s. 
Figure 2: Population Growth Rate, 1950-2050 (in %) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York 
Zooming in on the recent period (1997-2013), Figure 3 clearly shows that the population growth 
decreased slightly between 1997/1998 and 2004/2005 from 2.2% to 1.9%. However, the demographic 
growth has followed an opposite trend from the mid-2000s. This increase in population growth is 
temporary and probably due to the change of the age structure of the Egyptian population, especially 
the arrival of a large cohort of young people at the age of having children.  
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Figure 3: Rate of Growth of the Egyptian Population, 1997-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IDSC and CAPMAS (2013) 
Window of Opportunity and Youth Bulge 
As shown in Figure 4, and based on estimates and projections (medium variant assumption) of the 
Population Division of the United Nations, Egypt entered the third phase of the demographic transition 
during the second half of the 1990s. This stage is characterised by a decrease in the proportion of 
children under the age of 15 and offset by an increase in the share of the population aged 15 years and 
over. This phase allows for the opening of a ‘window of opportunity’ due to a reduction of the 
pressure on the education system and an increase in the working-age population, which can result in 
an increase in production and economic growth. One of the challenges of this current period is the 
pressure on the labour market of a large cohort of young people aged 15 to 24 and in transition from 
school to work. Indeed, the graph shows that the youth share is high (about 20% of the population 
since the mid-60s). We also see that it reached its peak during the first decade of the 2000s. 
Figure 4: Egypt Population by Age Group, 1950-2100 (in %) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2011): World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York 
In addition to insufficient economic growth and labour demand, the insertion into the labour market of 
this large young cohort is thus a major challenge and results in high unemployment rates among young 
people seeking their first job. Figure 1 shows that the share of young people (under 25 years) will 
2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 
2.2% 
2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 
2.0% 
1.9% 
2.2% 
2.1% 
2.7% 
2.2% 
2.3% 
2.5% 2.4% 
1.5%
1.7%
1.9%
2.1%
2.3%
2.5%
2.7%
2.9%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
50
1
9
55
1
9
60
1
9
65
1
9
70
1
9
75
1
9
80
1
9
85
1
9
90
1
9
95
2
0
00
2
0
05
2
0
10
2
0
15
2
0
20
2
0
25
2
0
30
2
0
35
2
0
40
2
0
45
2
0
50
2
0
55
2
0
60
2
0
65
2
0
70
2
0
75
2
0
80
2
0
85
2
0
90
2
0
95
2
1
00
0-14 15-24 25-64 65+ 15-64
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
4 
continue to decline until 2100, but that the share of the 25-64 year olds will start to decline from 2045, 
which will lead to an accelerated phase of the aging of the Egyptian population in the labour force. 
Labour Force  
The following results are based on the Labour Force Sample Surveys (LFSS) from 2007 to 2011 
carried out by CAPMAS. These surveys are conducted on a quarterly basis and allow an analysis of 
the evolution of the labour force, unemployment and employment by gender, educational level and 
economic activity.  
Table 1 presents the volume and rate of growth of the labour force from 2007 to 2011. These are 
measured taking into account the broad definition of economic activity (including subsistence 
activities) and the standard definition of unemployment: not participating in any economic activity, 
willing to work, available for work, seeking a job and not finding one. This table shows that the 
Egyptian labour force was made up of 27 million persons in 2011, with the male labour force (20.5 
million) almost three times higher than the female labour force (6.6 million). 2007-2011 the total 
labour force grew by 8.7%, increasing more rapidly among women (+10.8%) than among men 
(+8.1%). It is difficult to identify a trend in the growth rate of the labour force as it varies sharply from 
one year to another especially among women.  
Table 1: Volume and Growth Rate of the Labour Force (15-64) by Gender, 2007-2011 
Volume   2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Male 18 973 424 19 558 349 19 742 653 20 082 469 20 509 220 
 Female 5 934 561 5 801 597 6 326 715 6 210 010 6 576 207 
 Total 24 907 985 25 359 946 26 069 368 26 292 479 27 085 427 
       
Growth Rate  2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2007-2011 
 Male 3.1% 0.9% 1.7% 2.1% 8.1% 
 Female -2.2% 9.1% -1.8% 5.9% 10.8% 
 Total 1.8% 2.8% 0.9% 3.0% 8.7% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Table 2 indicates that the labour force participation rate is relatively low in Egypt (52.2% in 2011). 
But this overall participation rate masks, once again, gender disparities. While male participation rate 
is high (78.3% in 2011), female participation rate is very low (25.6%), which is one of the 
characteristics of the labour markets of the Middle East and North Africa region. 2007-2011 the 
participation rate grew more slowly (+2.6%) than the labour force itself(+8.7%) due to a rapid growth 
in the working age population (15-64 year olds).  
Table 2: Labour Force Participation by Gender (15-64), 2007-2011 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Male 0.760 0.768 0.768 0.786 0.783 
Female 0.248 0.237 0.252 0.245 0.256 
Total 0.509 0.508 0.513 0.517 0.522 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Participation rates by age group (Figure 5 and Table 1A) show that the female curve pattern is quite 
similar to the male curve, but it is much flatter. Male participation is relatively low among the 
youngest age groups (fewer than 25 years old who are mostly at school) and then increases to reach 
Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt’s Migration Potential 
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almost universal participation among those aged 25 to 49. It eventually decreases by the age of 50 
(early retirement) and decreases at an accelerating rate among men aged 60 to 64 years (retirement 
age). The trend of male participation rates by age is very stable from 2007 to 2011.  
The female participation rate is lower than that of men in all age groups. The female participation 
rate is extremely low among those aged 15 to 19 due to the school enrolment of a significant portion 
of the youngest women. It then reaches a first peak (note though a low peak at around 30%) among the 
age group 20-24 and then decreases slightly among those aged 25-29 and 30-34 (corresponding with 
the age at marriage and the age of childbearing). It rises slightly among the age groups 35-39 and 40-
45 and then decreases sharply among the 50-59 and 60-64 year olds years to achieve an extremely low 
rate of about 8% there. Over the period 2007-2011 the female labour forces varies very little by age 
except that the participation rate of women aged 40-64 years increased slightly. 
Figure 5: Labour Force Participation by Gender and Age Group (15-64), 2007-2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Figure 6 and Table 2A present the participation rates by gender and educational level. Despite the fact 
that the male and female curves look very similar, the relationship between the participation rate and 
the education level differs by gender. The male participation is almost universal (or almost equal to 
100%) at all educational levels except for those with less than secondary education and holders of a 
secondary school diploma. This is explained by the fact that these educational levels (unlike post-
secondary and university levels) are not terminal and, therefore, men are enrolled in education to 
pursue their studies. On the contrary the female participation rate is closely linked to the educational 
level achieved. The rate increases continuously with the educational level except for women with 
lower than secondary education (as with men because it is a non-terminal level of education). Female 
behaviour in entering the labour market is closely linked to the educational level achieved and the 
female participation rate reaches a very high level among those with a university degree (62.5% in 
2011). Differences in participation rates between men and women have a tendency to decrease with 
the level of education between 2007 and 2011.  
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Figure 6: Labour Force Participation by Gender and Educational Level (15-64), 2007-2011 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Employment 
Table 3 presenting the volume and rate of growth of employment by sex between 2007 and 2011 
shows that the number of women employed is about four times lower than the number of men 
employed, confirming the low participation of women in the labour market. The evolution over from 
2007 to 2011 shows that employment increased by 4.8% (slightly stronger for women than for 
men).Male employment, meanwhile, has declined (-2.2%) between 2010 and 2011 as expected, female 
employment, instead, increased slightly over the same period (+1.6%). It seems that the economic 
downturn in 2011 affected male employment but not female employment.  
Table 3: Volume and Growth Rate of Employment (15-64) by Gender, 2007-2011 
Volume   2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Male 17878235 18509308 18780542 19103865 18696146 
 Female 4460615 4601006 4754789 4654461 4729770 
 Total 22331464 23102052 23529827 23756217 23412880 
Growth Rate  2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2007-2011 
 Male 3.5% 1.5% 1.7% -2.2% 4.5% 
 Female 3.1% 3.3% -2.1% 1.6% 6.0% 
 Total 3.5% 1.9% 1.0% -1.4% 4.8% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Tables 4 and 5 show the distribution and evolution of employment by sex and economic sector 
between 2007 and 2011. The private sector is the main employer of both men and women, but at a 
higher rate for men than for women (respectively 76.7% and 60.0% in 2011). The public sector is 
mainly composed of the government sector as the share of public enterprises is relatively low (ranging 
from 1.2% and 3.2% for men and women respectively in 2011). 
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Table 4: Employment Distribution by Economic Sector (15-64), 2007-2011 
  Economic Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Male Government 21.9% 20.6% 20.6% 19.5% 20.1% 
 
Public Enterprises 4.1% 3.8% 3.3% 3.7% 3.2% 
 
Total Public 26.0% 24.5% 23.9% 23.2% 23.3% 
 
Total Private 74.0% 75.5% 76.1% 76.8% 76.7% 
  Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Female Government 39.1% 37.7% 36.5% 37.5% 38.8% 
 
Public Enterprises 1.7% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 
 
Total Public 40.8% 39.1% 37.7% 38.8% 40.0% 
 
Total Private 59.2% 60.9% 62.3% 61.2% 60.0% 
  Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
The evolution of the distribution of employment by economic sector shows that the public 
employment share fell and the private sector increased for both men and women between 2007 and 
2011. However, the share of public employment fell much more sharply for men than for women 
(respectively -10.2% and -2.1%). The bulk of the decline in the public sector took place between 2007 
and 2008, the rate of decline slowing thereafter between 2009 and 2011 (with the exception of female 
employment in public enterprises between 2010 and 2011). The share of state-owned enterprise 
employment declined most significantly reflecting the program of restructuring and privatisation that 
was launched beginning in the second half of the 1990s.  
Table 5: Rate of Growth of the Distribution of Employment by Economic Sector and by Gender 
(15-64), 2007-2011 
  
Economic Sector 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2007-
2011 
Male Government -5.8% 0.1% -5.4% 3.0% -8.1% 
 
Public Enterprises -6.6% -14.9% 12.5% 0.0% -21.3% 
 
Total Public -5.9% -2.3% -2.9% 3.0% -10.2% 
 
Total Private 2.1% 0.7% 0.9% 0.0% 3.6% 
Female Government -3.8% -3.2% 2.8% 3.6% -0.9% 
 
Public Enterprises -16.4% -9.4% 6.5% -14.2% -30.8% 
 
Total Public -4.3% -3.4% 2.9% 2.9% -2.1% 
 
Total Private 3.0% 2.2% -1.7% -1.9% 1.4% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Unemployment  
As shown in Table 6 the unemployment rate reaches 11.8% in 2011 with a female unemployment rate 
(21.0%) nearly 2.4 times higher than the male equivalent (8.8%). The evolution of the unemployment 
rate over from 2007 to 2011 is marked by a slight increase in the unemployment rate between 2007 
and 2010 (it rose from 8.7% to 9.1%). This was due to an increase in the female unemployment rate 
that compensates a marked decrease in the male unemployment rate. The sharp economic downturn 
that followed the uprising of 25 January 2011 has greatly affected the unemployment rate: it increased 
by 29.7% between 2010 and 2011. Most of this increase was due to a strong rise in the male 
unemployment rate (+79.6%), while for its part the female unemployment rate, instead, decreased (-
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
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7.1%). As shown in Table 3A the bulk of the increase in male unemployment took place during the 
first quarter of 2011 (+74.5%). The latest statistics (CAPMAS, 2013) show that the unemployment 
rate has continued to increase, in 2012 and in early 2013, albeit at a slower pace. Indeed, the 
unemployment rate rose from 9.3% in the first quarter of 2012 to 9.6% in the fourth quarter of 2012 to 
reach 9.7% in the first quarter of 2013. The unemployment rate for men and women have both 
continued to grow reaching respectively 13.2% and 25.0% in the first quarter of 2013. Moreover, the 
number of unemployed Egyptians peaked in the first quarter of 2013, with nearly 3.6 million people 
looking for a job (2.0 million men and 1.5 million women).  
Table 6: Unemployment Rate and Growth of Unemployment Rate by Gender (15-64), 2007-2011 
   2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Male 5.7% 5.3% 4.9% 4.9% 8.8% 
Female 18.0% 18.1% 20.0% 22.6% 21.0% 
Total 8.7% 8.3% 8.6% 9.1% 11.8% 
   2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2007/2011 
Growth Rate of 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Male -7.0% -7.5% 0.0% 79.6% 54.4% 
Female 0.6% 10.5% 13.0% -7.1% 16.7% 
Total -4.6% 3.6% 5.8% 29.7% 35.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
The unemployment rate in Egypt particularly affects young people aged 15 to 29. As illustrated by 
Figure 7, the unemployment rate increases with age to reach a peak among young people aged 20 to 
24 and then gradually decreases with age. In 2011 the female unemployment rate (52.5%) is more than 
twice that of men (23.9%) of the 20-24 age group (Table 4A). Unemployment mainly concerns young 
people seeking to enter the labour market after completing their studies or after dropping out of 
school. Table 5A also shows that between 2010 and 2011 the male unemployment rate increased 
particularly among the older age groups (34 to 64 years old), that were usually less affected by 
unemployment. On the contrary between 2010 and 2011 the female unemployment rate declined for 
all age groups from 15 to 34 years (especially among the younger group) but it increased significantly 
among those aged over 35. The opposite trend in the unemployment rate by gender in 2010-2011 
substantially reduced the gap between male and female unemployment rates. While between 2007 and 
2010 the female unemployment rate was three to four times higher than the male unemployment rate: 
in 2011the difference was around 2.4 times higher in favour of women. Moreover, as shown in table 
6A in the annex, due to the sharp rise in the number of unemployed men in parallel with a slight 
decrease in the number of unemployed women between 2010 and 2011, the female share of total 
unemployment fell sharply from 59% in 2010 to 43% in 2011.  
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Figure 7: Unemployment Rate by Gender and by Age Group, 2007-2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Figure 8 shows that unemployment particularly affects the most educated. Indeed, in 2007, the male 
and female unemployment rates increased steadily with educational attainment reaching a peak among 
graduates of technical secondary schools: 9.2% and 31.4%, respectively, among men and women. It 
then decreased slightly among the holders a post-secondary institute diploma, and then rose slightly 
among women with a university degree (26.2%) and more strongly among graduate men (12.8%). 
This graph also shows that between 2007 and 2011, the unemployment rate has sharply increased 
among the least qualified men: it was multiplied by seven among illiterates, by 3.6 among men with 
less than secondary education and by two among general secondary school graduates. In 2011 the 
curve of male unemployment became flatter and differences in unemployment rates between 
educational levels were reduced. Between 2007 and 2011, female unemployment rate increased among 
women with a lower than intermediate level of education. It should be noted that between 2010 and 
2011, the female unemployment rate increased dramatically among secondary diploma holders 
(+79%), while it declined among post-secondary graduates (-19%) and university graduates (-5%).  
Figure 8: Unemployment Rate by Gender and by Educational Level, 2007, 2010 and 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
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Long-term Unemployment 
The distribution of the unemployed by unemployment duration in 2010 and 2011 is set out in Table 7. 
It clearly shows that in 2010 the vast majority of the unemployed were long-term unemployed. In fact, 
61.1% of unemployed men and 73.3% of unemployed women are unemployed for over a year. And a 
very large proportion has been unemployed for over two years (36.4% of men and 53.7% of women) 
and more than three years (20.8% of men and 39.0% of women). This very long-term unemployment 
can be explained not only by the fact that the majority of unemployed Egyptians are educated and are 
looking for a job corresponding to their expectations. There is also the fact that they usually belong to 
relatively wealthy households who can support them financially (Amer, 2011). The change from 2010 
to 2011 is interesting. It involves a very significant change in the distribution of unemployment 
duration among men, while that among women is relatively constant. The share of long-term 
unemployed men is reversed in effect between 2010 and 2011, declining from 61.1% in 2010 to only 
39.3% in 2011. This is probably due to the influx of newly unemployed during the year 2011 after a 
significant economic slowdown and a sharp increase in the unemployment rate.  
Table 7: Distribution of Unemployment Duration by Gender (15-64) in 2010 and 2011 
  2010 2011 
Male     
0-1 year 39.9% 61.7% 
1-2 years 23.6% 14.2% 
2-3 years 15.6% 7.9% 
3-4 years 9.0% 6.0% 
More than 4 years  11.9% 10.1% 
Long-term unemployment (more than 1 year) 39.9% 61.1% 
Female     
0-1 year 27.7% 29.7% 
1+-2 year 18.6% 20.5% 
2+-3 years 14.7% 11.2% 
3+-4 years 10.5% 7.4% 
4+ years 28.6% 31.3% 
Long-term unemployment (more than 1 year) 72.3% 70.3% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2010-2011 
2. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Egyptian migrants 
This section focuses on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Egyptian migrants, in 
general and by region of migration: Gulf Cooperation Countries – GCC –and other Arab countries as 
opposed to OECD countries. Education and skill levels of Egyptian migrants according to region of 
migration are also analysed.  
Egyptian emigration is a relatively recent phenomenon, since it mainly developed in the 1970s, 
following strong demand from Arab countries, benefiting from higher oil prices and a reform in 
Egyptian legislation facilitating temporary and permanent migration (Zohry, 2003 and Wahba, 2010). 
Since the 1970s, migration flows have varied in particular according to oil price fluctuations and the 
political conditions in the MENA region such as the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War and legislation 
favouring nationals in Gulf countries (Wahba, 2010 and IOM, 2010).  
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The number of Egyptian migrants often varies substantially from source to source. According to 
CAPMAS this number decreased from 4.6 million in 2000 (1.9 million to Arab countries and 2.7 
million to OECD countries) to 3.9 million in 2006 (including 2.0 million to Arab countries). This 
figure varies widely according to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Manpower and Emigration that detected 4.7 million emigrants in 2006. More recent data from the 
World Bank claims that there were 3.7 million emigrants in 2010 (World Bank, 2011).  
The main host countries of Egyptian migrants are overwhelmingly Arab countries, followed by 
Western regions such as Europe and the United States. Focusing on return migrants in 1988 and 2006 
Wahba (2008) shows that while Iraq was the main country of residence for return migrants in 1988 
(with nearly 25% of migrants), in 2006 it was replaced by Saudi Arabia (with nearly a third of 
returnees), followed by Jordan, Libya and Kuwait. Table 8 presents the destinations abroad of current 
migrants in 2006 (Wahba, 2008) and illustrates the fact that Arab countries absorb 93% of migrants 
and Gulf states host almost two-thirds of Egyptian migrants.  
Table 8: Destinations of Current Migrants in 2006 
Country % 
Saudi Arabia 37.43 
Jordan 16.11 
Libya 13.64 
Kuwait 12.27 
Emirates 11.56 
OECD Europe 2.24 
USA and Canada  1.89 
Other Arab Countries 1.68 
Sudan and Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1.24 
Source: Wahba (2008) based on ELMPS 2006 
The Migration and Remittances Factbook (World Bank, 2011) gives a similar distribution of 
destinations: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, the USA, the West Bank 
and Gaza, Italy, Qatar and Yemen.  
The socio-demographic profile of Egyptian emigrants is clearly identified: it is essentially young 
men belonging to rural rather than urban areas and their educational level is related to the country of 
destination (IOM 2010 and Wahba, 2008 and 2010).  
Egyptian migration is a male phenomenon. Using modules on migration from the Labour Force 
Sample Survey of 1988 (LFSS 1988) and the Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS 
2006) J. Wahba (2008) finds that 94.3% return of overseas migrants were men in 1988 and 90.5% 
were men in 2006. According to CAPMAS, the gender distribution is quite similar in 2009: 97.1% of 
temporary migrants were males. And according to the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 83.6% 
of permanent migrants were males in that same year.  
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The general education profile of migrants is summarised in Figure 9. It illustrates that the 
educational profile of current and former migrants (return migrants) is relatively similar, but that the 
profile differs from that of non-migrants. Migrants are, indeed, generally better educated than non-
migrants. Half of non-migrants have a lower secondary education level against respectively 35% to 
40% of current migrants and return migrants. Similarly, less than a quarter of migrants are illiterate or 
without a diploma, while more than a third of non-migrants are uneducated. And between one fifth and 
one quarter of migrants have a university degree or higher, while only 16% of non-migrants possess 
this kind of educational level (Wahba, 2010).  
Figure 9: Education of Non-Migrants, Current and Return Migrants in 2006 (in %) 
 
Source: Wahba (2010) based on ELMPS 2006 
Wahba (2010) also suggests that the educational profile of Egyptian migrants differs depending on the 
country of destination. In 2006, nearly 71% of Egyptians working in Arab countries had an 
intermediate or lower intermediate degree (respectively 38.9% and 31.9%) and 25.8% have a higher 
degree. Migrants to Europe are more concentrated in an intermediate educational level (50.5% of 
emigrants) and a lower percentage (16.9%) have a higher education level. Finally, Egyptians migrating 
to the United States have a much higher level of education to the extent that 76.2% have a graduate 
degree and 16.1% an intermediate degree.  
The distribution of return migrants by occupation (Table 9) also shows that it differs from that of 
non-migrants. Based on data ELMPS 2006, J. Wahba (2008) shows that return migrants occupy 
professional positions hierarchically higher than non-migrants. In fact, a little less than half of the 
returnees are in a position of technical and scientific or management, against only 26% of non-
migrants. The former are also represented among occupations related to agriculture, production, sales 
and services. 
  
None Primary Preparatory Secondary
Above
Intermediate
University
and Higher
Current migrants 22.2 7.69 5.56 35.85 5.1 22.26
Returnees 23.03 7.36 10.23 38.45 6.18 24.97
Non-migrants 34.17 11 6 28 5.65 16.04
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Table 9: Distribution of Non-Migrants and Returnees by Occupation in 2006 (%) 
Occupation Non-
Migrants 
Returnees 
Technical and Scientific 20.72 32.20 
Management 5.21 16.38 
Clerical 6.36 7.29 
Sales 8.80 3.17 
Services 8.55 3.30 
Agriculture 23.97 17.44 
Production 26.40 20.21 
Source: Wahba (2008) based on ELMPS 2006 
As for the educational profile, the occupation/skill profile of the migrants varies across destination 
countries. For example, in 2002, in general, migrants to Arab countries occupy mostly scientific or 
technical or management positions. But this general distribution masks disparities among Arab 
countries. For example, more than two-thirds of migrants to Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon are production 
workers (Wahba, 2010).  
Push and pull factors affect the decisions of Egyptians to migrate. On the one hand, better 
economic conditions in host countries attract potential migrants. On the other hand, the high 
unemployment rate among secondary and university graduates, the pressure of new entrants to the 
labour market and the difficulty of getting a job matching the graduates’ skills are push factors.  
The constant unemployment structure, particularly affecting the young and better educated will likely 
continue to be a push factor toward migration. The fact that the male unemployment rate increased 
significantly between 2010 and 2011 due to a sharp slowdown in economic growth may also reinforce 
this phenomenon. However, as the increase in male unemployment particularly affected the less 
educated it is more likely that it will generate more migration to the Arab countries such as Iraq, 
Jordan and Lebanon.  
 
3. Analysis of the findings of the survey of Egyptian youth orientations towards 
migration  
The drivers of migration are often the same as before the revolution: demographically, a high rate of 
population growth and a pronounced youth bulge creates pressure on the labour market; economically, 
low income, endemic under-unemployment and low rewards to education result in frustration among 
the youth. While the continuation of migration is likely, questions must be asked: what will the 
migrants’ destination be (Gulf, Libya, North America or Europe); what will their profile be in terms of 
skills and gender; and what about their migration patterns (temporary or permanent; regular or 
irregular)? 
In order to find answers to the above questions and to assess the potential for migration, a survey of 
young Egyptians was carried out by Baseera or the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, an 
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independent organisation for public opinion research, recently established (April 2012)
2
. This section 
presents the results of this survey in terms of the views of migration of young Egyptians after the 
revolution: the survey was carried out The survey was made by telephone interviews with 2,509 young 
people aged 18 to 35 on 9 and 10 January 2013. It included attempts to identify the socio-demographic 
characteristics of young Egyptians wishing to emigrate and the pull factors and push factors according 
to socio-economic background. The sample size was randomly selected from mobile and landline 
databases of Baseera center. Each of the 27 governorates is represented in proportion to the size of its 
population. Topics for primary analysis include: the present situation; the perception of the present 
situation; migration plans, strategies, and considerations; and wider expectations.  
Methodology: a case-control survey  
The methodology used for analysing the intentions and drivers to migration was a case-control 
method. The cases were young people with plans to migrate, while the controls were young people 
with no (current) plans to migrate. Cases and controls were sampled in equal numbers and matched, 
i.e. identically distributed, according to basic characteristics (age, sex, and a few others). 
The case-control method allows small non-randomised samples to accurately address simple 
questions such as ‘are individuals with a given characteristic A more/less inclined than individuals 
without this characteristic to develop a characteristic B?’ In the present case, ‘characteristic B’ is 
having the intention to emigrate. Collecting a set of characteristics for both cases and controls allowed 
identifying characteristics that differ between cases and controls and that can, therefore, be considered 
as migration drivers. In a last step, cases were asked specific questions regarding their emigration 
plans.  
Interviews were conducted as phone interviews, and included three questionnaires. As shown in 
Appendix I – Structure of the Survey (below), the first-step questionnaire, used to select cases and 
controls, was short and contained only the basic matching characteristics and the question about ‘do 
you have any plans to migrate abroad?’ The second-step questionnaire was common to cases and 
controls and collected a number of questions about the characteristics of the individuals (education, 
employment, family situation, relatives and friends abroad, etc.); as well a few questions about how 
they view their own future economically, family-wise, and in terms of skill upgrades. The third-step 
questionnaire was limited to cases and aimed at collecting information through open-ended questions 
on migration plans and expectations about migration.  
A brief overview of the sample presented in Table 10 shows that the sample was composed of 53% 
females and 47% males. The breakdown by age group shows that the 18 to 23 year-olds, the 24-29 
year-olds and the 30-35 year-olds represent respectively 31%, 28% and 41% of the sample. Older 
women are relatively over-represented compared to the men in the same age group. Conversely, 
younger women are under-represented compared to men.  
  
                                                     
2
 This survey was carried out for the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the European University Institute (EUI) and the 
Center for Migration and Refugees Studies (CMRS), of the American University in Cairo.  
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Table 10: Sample Size Distribution by Gender, Age Group, Region of Residence an Educational 
Attainment (in %)  
 
Male Female Total 
Age Group    
18-20 21.3 17.7 19.4 
21-23 13.4 10.7 12.0 
24-26 15.0 14.4 14.7 
27-29 15.4 10.9 13.0 
30-32 16.9 26.4 21.9 
33-35 18.1 19.9 19.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Region    
Urban Governorates 20.1 19.4 19.7 
Lower Egypt Urban 11.3 11.3 11.3 
Lower Egypt Rural 32.8 32.7 32.7 
Upper Egypt Urban 12.4 11.7 12.0 
Upper Egypt Rural 21.9 23.7 22.8 
Frontier Governorates 1.5 1.3 1.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Educational Attainment    
Preparatory & Less 34.4 40.6 37.7 
Intermediate 43.3 39.6 41.4 
Above Intermediate 7.3 5.6 6.4 
University & Above 15.1 14.1 14.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Employment Status    
Employed 75.4 13.4 43.0 
Unemployed 8.4 12.0 10.3 
Out of the Labour Force 16.2 74.6 46.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 47.4 52.6 100.0 
Sample Size 1190 1319 2509 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
Geographical distribution is not differentiated by sex and is assumed to replicate the geographical 
distribution of the entire Egyptian population. The most populated areas lie in rural Lower and Upper 
Egypt and in the urban governorates. As for the distribution by level of education, more than three-
quarters of the sample has an intermediate or lower educational level; nearly 6% have higher than 
intermediate level and around 15% have a university or higher degree. Young women are 
overrepresented among the less educated (preparatory and lower) and under-represented among the 
intermediate and university graduates. Finally, the distribution of the sample by employment status 
reflects the disparity of access to the labour market according to gender. Young men are widely 
employed (75%), 8% reported being unemployed and 16% are inactive (probably studying or 
undergoing their military service). As for women, nearly half of them (47%) are inactive, 43% are 
employed and 10% are unemployed 
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Intention to emigrate 
Amongst 2,509 persons aged 18-35 that were interviewed by phone, 468 (18.7%) have declared that 
they have an intention to emigrate. These are the cases. They comprise 81.8% males and 18.2% 
females.  
Controls (young people with no intention of emigrating) were non-randomly selected amongst all 
those interviewed in order to have distributions according to age group, sex and residence (urban vs. 
rural) similar to those of controls (Tables 11).  
Cases comprise 104 (22%) persons who contemplate permanent emigration and 364 (78%) with a 
long-term but not permanent experience of migration (Table 12).  
 
Table 11: Distribution of cases and controls by 
age, sex and residence 
Group Cases Controls 
Age Group 
18 – 20  39 39 
21 – 23  66 66 
24 – 26  92 92 
27 – 29  92 92 
30 – 32  98 98 
33 – 35  81 81 
Total 468 468 
Sex 
Male 383 383 
Female 85 85 
Residence 
Urban  366 361 
Rural  102 107 
Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPC/EUI, 
CMRS/AUC) 
 
Table 12: Distribution of cases and controls by intention to 
emigrate 
Plans to Migrate Abroad Cases Controls 
Yes/ Permanently 104 0 
Yes/ Temporarily 364 0 
No  0 468 
Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPC/EUI, 
CMRS/AUC) 
Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt’s Migration Potential 
17 
The drivers of emigration 
‘Migration driver’ refers to any variable according to which the two distributions of cases on one side, 
and controls on the other differ significantly.
3
 Migration drivers come under three following groups: 
individual characteristics that have some stability over time or ‘structural’ characteristics (Figure 10); 
the current situation at the time of the survey (Figure 11); and familiarity with migration (Figure 12). 
Individual structural characteristics 
Three individual characteristics are found to be drivers of migration: university education, marital 
status and religion. 
Figure 10: Drivers of the intention to emigrate among Egyptian youth in 2013 – Individual 
characteristics  
 
Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPC/EUI, 
CMRS/AUC) 
 University education 
65.4% of the cases have a university education (whether they graduated or not) compared with 56.2% 
of the controls. Just as many young people in the developing world, young Egyptians with a university 
education feel that education opens job opportunities abroad and they have more often than others a 
desire to emigrate.  
 Marital status 
50.9% of the cases are still unmarried compared with 39.5% of the controls. Having family 
responsibilities is a disincentive to migration. At first glance, this seems to be counterintuitive as it is 
often thought that feeding a family left behind in the origin country is a major reason why men 
migrate. But this finding is consistent with several surveys where it was found that saving money to 
                                                     
3
 Differences between cases and controls are tested at 5% significance level using the t-statistic (reported in the equation 
below), we first compute the mean, variance and standard deviations of the two groups of Cases (1) and Controls (2). The 
computed t-ratio is then compared with the standard critical value given by the t-distribution table. Whenever the 
absolute value of the computed t-ratio is greater than the critical value, that is if (t > 1.96), we can say that the 
difference between the population of cases and controls is statistically significant.  
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pay for marriage was another strong motivation behind the emigration of many young unmarried 
Egyptian men. 
 Religion 
Being a Christian is a driver of migration: indeed, Christians are in significantly higher proportion 
among cases (8.1%) than among controls (3.2%). The survey does not allow us to disentangle the 
various factors susceptible for explaining this fact. Are Egyptian Christians more inclined than 
Muslims to emigrate because they are more likely to be within the categories leading to migration: e.g. 
university education, search for employment, relatives or friends established abroad, etc.. Or is it, 
rather, because being a Christian is, in itself, a migration factor? A remarkable finding of the survey is 
that, for those who are Christians, religious belonging is by far the most important driver for 
emigration. Indeed, while the difference between the percentage of Christians and Muslims is small in 
absolute terms (4.9 points), as a result of Christians being a small proportion of the Egyptian 
population (between 5 and 6 per cent according to population censuses): the difference in relative 
terms is considerable (253%). Feeling insecure at home may be one of the reasons why Christians 
express a much greater wish to emigrate than Muslims to leave Egypt. 
Current situation 
The present situation of the country regarding labour and political developments has presented a 
number of factors for which young people may wish to emigrate.  
Figure 11: Drivers of the intention to emigrate among Egyptian youth in 2013 – Individual’s 
current situation  
 
Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPC/EUI, 
CMRS/AUC) 
 Seeking (better) employment 
Young people in search of a job – whether they already have one or not– represent 56.7% of cases 
compared with 35.2% of the controls. Finding a job is the main driver of migration among young 
Egyptians. 
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 Over-qualification 
For those who are currently employed, feeling oneself over-qualified for a current job is significantly 
more frequent among cases (27.6%) than controls (17.5%). Dissatisfaction with a current job and 
underemployment are actually strong reasons why young people contemplate emigration.  
 Lack of confidence in the stability of Egypt  
32.5% of cases, against 26.9% of controls, declared their concern about the future of their country, a 
sentiment that is associated with a desire to migrate. 
Familiarity with migration 
Finally, for emigration to be a realistic option, young Egyptians need to have a certain level of contact 
with migrants and their stories.  
Figure 12: Drivers of the intention to emigrate among Egyptian youth in 2013 – Familiarity with 
migration  
 
Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPC/EUI, 
CMRS/AUC) 
 Exposure to other’s migration 
Most young Egyptians have heard about expatriate co-nationals but this is even more so among those 
who declare an intention to migrate (87.1%) than among those who do not (70.4%).  
 Success stories from Egyptian expatriates 
Exposure to other migration experiences becomes an even stronger driver of migration if experiences 
of expatriate co-nationals are reported to be positive: 86.2% of cases declared that they had heard 
about successful Egyptian migrants, against 75.9% of controls.  
 Relatives and friends currently abroad 
Having one or several family or community members abroad is an additional reason for young 
Egyptians wish to migrate: 88.3% of cases against 74.0% of controls.  
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 Country where relatives and friends abroad live 
One striking finding of the survey is that having family members or friends abroad is an incentive to 
migrate no matter the country where they live save in one case: Saudi Arabia. Indeed fewer cases 
(54.2%) than controls (61.7%) have relatives or friends living in Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia is 
actually the most frequent destination for Egyptian migrants, stories brought back home by Egyptians 
living there may sometimes reflect negative experiences and act as a disincentive to emigrate. A 
mitigated image of Saudi Arabia was already found in an Egyptian survey of push and pull factors of 
migration conducted in the late 1990s (CAPMAS & EUROSTAT, 1999). By contrast, having relatives 
and friends living in the West (e.g. USA, Canada and France) is a powerful migration driver. 
By contrast with the above migration drivers, none of the variables reflecting current living 
standards (e.g. possession of a mobile phone, a washing machine, or a car) was found to produce any 
significant effect on the desire to emigrate. 
To summarise, being aged between 24 and 29 years, not being married, having a higher 
educational, having family members abroad, being worried or uncertain about Egypt’s future stability 
are elements that encourage young men and young women to migrate. Male unemployment is also an 
important push factor towards migration.  
The migration project 
Young people with an intention to emigrate (cases) have already a clear idea of why they wish to do so 
how they can accomplish their wish and reach their intended country of destination, and what sort of 
reasons might prompt them to give up their project and return to Egypt once abroad. 
Table 13 presents the reasons given by respondents to their aspiration to migrate. The most 
frequent reason expressed is to work abroad. Almost all of the young men (95%) say they want to find 
a job (temporarily or permanently). 71% of women state the same reason. 16% of men and 36% of 
women, meanwhile, want to leave Egypt to escape the insecurity. Among the other reasons given is 
the desire for better levels of income.  
Table 13: Distribution of Reasons for Migration 
  Male Female 
  Yes No Yes No 
Employment (temporary or 
permanent) 94.6 5.5 70.8 29.2 
Gain Education/Skill 3.8 96.2 7.2 92.8 
Cultural Reasons 1.7 98.4 0.9 99.1 
Fleeing insecurity 15.6 84.5 35.9 64.1 
Other 6.8 93.2 10.4 89.7 
Sample Size 383 85 
Source: Authors calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
According to table 14, respondents recognise that relatives and friends are the main and, indeed, 
almost the only support for migration.  
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Table 14: Identified persons/institutions that can help to migrate 
  Male  Female Total 
Government 6.6 7.1 6.7 
Universities 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Family 44.8 52.9 46.2 
Friends 32.9 13.7 29.6 
Other 35.6 31.7 34.9 
Source: Authors calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
As shown in Figure 10, young people wishing to emigrate want primarily to settle in Arab countries 
(mainly in the GCC countries and primarily in Saudi Arabia) and then in European countries (mainly 
in Italy and Great Britain) and other OECD countries (mainly the U.S.A. and Canada). This 
distribution differs slightly depending on gender. Men and women want in the same proportion 
(around two-thirds) to emigrate to Arab countries and to non-Arab countries (one third), but women 
are more likely to head to Gulf countries and to non-European OECD countries than men.  
Figure 10: Distribution of Desired Country of Destination by Gender (in %) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the desired recipient countries among young unemployed men 
wishing to migrate
4
. The vast majority of unemployed young men who intend to emigrate wish to 
leave Egypt for Arab countries (81%) and mainly for GCC countries (60.4%); only 19.8% would like 
to move to the OECD countries (mainly to non-European countries).  
The recent rise in unemployment may eventually lead to a migration flow to the Gulf countries. 
However, one should be very careful since the intention to migrate rarely translates into effective 
migration.  
  
                                                     
4
 As the size of the sample of unemployed young men who said they intended to leave Egypt is relatively small, it is not 
possible to disaggregate the distribution by educational level.  
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Figure 11: Distribution of Desired Country of Destination by Gender among Unemployed Males 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
Reasons for migration according to the destination country (Arab versus OECD countries) are 
presented in Table 15. The vast majority of young people (men and women) quote better employment 
prospects regardless of the country of destination. The possibility of studying abroad is most often 
cited in the case of a desire to emigrate to Europe or North America. It is interesting to note that young 
people do not believe that it is easy migrate to a foreign country, whether it is an Arab country or an 
OECD country.  
Table 15: Distribution of the reason for the desired country of destination 
  Male Female 
  
Arab 
Country 
OECD 
Country 
Arab 
Country 
OECD 
Country 
Better education prospects 8.9 16.4 4.8 19.0 
Better employment prospects 81.4 77.4 71.8 61.8 
Easy access 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Language/cultural affinities 2.7 6.8 2.7 3.1 
Family/friends 9.0 11.0 15.8 12.0 
Other 17.3 16.3 17.7 35.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
It is interesting to note that the choice of the country of emigration varies by educational level. The 
more young people are educated the more they intend to migrate to OECD countries (Figure 12). 
Indeed, while about 22% of young people with a preparatory or lower level education wish to migrate 
to non-Arab countries, this proportion doubles with the educational level reaching 43% among those 
with a university degree.  
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Figure 12: Distribution of Desired Country of Destination by Educational Level (in %) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC) 
Finally, as shown in Table 16, the main constraints identified by the respondents are primarily: 
difficulty in obtaining an entry visa and the high cost of travel; and among other reasons the difficulty 
of finding a job abroad. It is interesting to note that the identified constraints do not differ according to 
the region (Arab/OECD).  
Table 16: Distribution of identified difficulties with migration 
  Arab Country OECD Country 
Lack of information 5.4 4.2   
Visa issues 52.3 56.1 
 Low recognition of skill/education 4.5 7.9 
 High expenses 31.4 27.4 
 Other 29.6 30.8   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC 
Factoring return 
Asked about what would prompt cases to return to Egypt from abroad, young people a majority 
declared that family issues would be a pressing reason. But only a minority thought that finding a 
suitable job in Egypt or getting married would be a sufficient reason for them to return once abroad. 
The importance of return factors does not vary along gender lines (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Factors that would prompt return to Egypt (in %) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the survey about Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC 
It is interesting to analyse the results of the Survey on Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian 
Youth in perspective with the findings of the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), conducted by 
the Population Council in 2009 with its module on migration aspirations. Even though the 
methodology used for the Survey conducted for MPC/EUI, CMRS/AUC (with a sample of around 
2,500 individuals) differs greatly from the one used by SYPE (a nationally representative survey with 
a sample of more than 15,000 people aged 10 to 29 years old), the comparison of the results might be 
informative. According to SYPE, 18.8% of young people aged 18 to 24 wanted to emigrate; a higher 
proportion than the one obtained from the Survey on Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian Youth 
(15.3% of youth aged 18 to 24 years declared they want to migrate in 2013).  
Conclusion 
The report recalls that the Egyptian labour market is characterised by a low participation rate (due to a 
low insertion of women) and a high unemployment rate among young people, women and secondary 
and university graduates. Recent developments (with the aftermath of the 25 January 2011 revolution) 
show a significant increase in the male unemployment rate, while female unemployment is slightly 
decreased but remains high. It is likely that the lower rate of female unemployment translates the fact 
that women have withdrawn from the labour market, discouraged by not being able to find 
employment opportunities in of the present severe economic downturn.  
Insofar as the Egyptian emigration primarily reflects the desire of Egyptians to find better 
employment opportunities abroad, especially in the Arab and Gulf countries, a substantial increase in 
male unemployment could motivate more young men to migrate.  
The findings of the Survey on Oriention towards Migration of Egyptian Youth (MPR/EUI and 
CMRS/AUC) show that the main reason for migration is employment. It, therefore, confirms the 
relationship between the conditions of the Egyptian labour market and migration.  
This survey reveals a new push factor towards migration related to the current political context: the 
perception of increased insecurity and political instability that followed the 25 January, 2011 
revolution. 
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Despite the differences in terms of methodology, a comparison of the results of SYPE regarding 
Egyptian Youth migration aspiration and the Survey on Orientation towards Migration of Egyptian 
Youth conducted for the Migration Policy Centre (EUI) and the Center for Migration and Refugees 
Studies (AUC) proves interesting. The fact that the proportion of the youth expressing their desire to 
migrate was higher in 2009 than in 2013 (before and after the Egyptian revolution) suggests that the 
current political climate has not substantially increased the desire to migrate among young Egyptians.  
  
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
26 
References 
Amer, M. 2011. “Les transitions incertaines de l’école à l’emploi” in Vincent Battesti et François 
Ireton, L’Egypte au Présent. Inventaire d’une société avant révolution. Actes Sud, Sindbad. Paris.  
Assaad, R. 2009. The Egyptian Labor Market Revisited. Cairo: The American University in Cairo and 
ERF Press.  
CAPMAS. 2013. Bulletin of Labor Force. January-March 2013 
CAPMAS and EUROSTAT 1999, Push and Pull Factors of International Migration – Country Report 
Egypt, Report 3/2000/E/n°7, Cairo November 1999.  
Di Bartolomeo, A. et al. 2010. CARIM Migration Profile: Egypt. European University Institute.  
International Organization for Migration. 2011. Migration Aspirations and Experiences of Egyptian 
Youth 
International Organization for Migration. 2010. World Migration Report. Communicating Effectively 
about Migration.  
Population Council. 2010. Survey of Young People in Egypt. Final Report.  
Sika, N. 2010. Highly Skilled Migration Patterns and Development: The Case of Egypt. Analytic and 
Synthetic Notes 2010/17. CARIM, European University Institute.  
Wahba, J. 2010. Labor Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Egypt. Chapter I – National 
Background Paper. European Commission. Occasional Paper 60, Volume III.  
Wahba, J. 2009. “An Overview of Internal and International Migration”, in Ragui Assaad (ed.) The 
Egyptian Labor Market Revisited. Cairo: The American University in Cairo and ERF Press  
World Bank. The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.  
Zohry, A. 2003. “The Place of Egypt in the Regional Migration System as a Receiving Country”. 
Revue européenne des migrations internationales. Vol. 19 – n°3 
  
Labour Market Outcomes and Egypt’s Migration Potential 
27 
Appendix 
Table 1A: Labour Force Participation Rate by Gender and by Age Group (15-64), 2007-2011  
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
15-19 Male 0.294 0.314 0.303 0.309 0.268 
 
Female 0.101 0.094 0.099 0.087 0.074 
  Total 0.205 0.211 0.207 0.201 0.176 
20-24 Male 0.670 0.692 0.68 0.691 0.709 
 
Female 0.296 0.305 0.315 0.291 0.296 
  Total 0.506 0.530 0.527 0.499 0.521 
25-29 Male 0.947 0.959 0.960 0.965 0.971 
 
Female 0.297 0.286 0.305 0.293 0.293 
  Total 0.610 0.616 0.625 0.623 0.621 
30-34 Male 0.989 0.988 0.992 0.981 0.985 
 
Female 0.283 0.259 0.270 0.271 0.284 
  Total 0.613 0.59 0.587 0.621 0.625 
35-39 Male 0.991 0.991 0.993 0.984 0.987 
 
Female 0.311 0.271 0.292 0.286 0.298 
  Total 0.631 0.606 0.613 0.625 0.628 
40-49 Male 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.973 0.977 
 
Female 0.311 0.295 0.309 0.304 0.343 
  Total 0.641 0.626 0.634 0.635 0.656 
50-59 Male 0.902 0.903 0.909 0.897 0.902 
 
Female 0.226 0.227 0.257 0.254 0.270 
  Total 0.576 0.572 0.584 0.577 0.589 
60-64 Male 0.487 0.538 0.537 0.509 0.517 
 
Female 0.052 0.111 0.098 0.119 0.077 
  Total 0.333 0.396 0.378 0.362 0.352 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
 
  
Mona Amer and Philippe Fargues 
28 
Table 2A: Labour Force Participation by Gender and by Educational Level (15-64), 2007-2011 
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Illiterate/Read and Write Male 0.916 0.913 0.911 0.897 0.900 
 
Femal
e 
0.197 0.188 0.205 0.191 0.215 
  Total 0.496 0.489 0.492 0.483 0.499 
Less than secondary Male 0.385 0.406 0.433 0.473 0.447 
 
Femal
e 
0.042 0.044 0.064 0.054 0.060 
  Total 0.239 0.251 0.275 0.287 0.275 
Secondary Male 0.747 0.766 0.763 0.807 0.820 
 
Femal
e 
0.293 0.275 0.277 0.263 0.274 
  Total 0.549 0.554 0.550 0.560 0.575 
Post-secondary Male 0.901 0.912 0.910 0.931 0.935 
 
Femal
e 
0.543 0.522 0.516 0.534 0.499 
  Total 0.743 0.747 0.741 0.760 0.748 
University and above Male 0.916 0.919 0.920 0.938 0.946 
 
Femal
e 
0.617 0.612 0.625 0.636 0.625 
  Total 0.794 0.790 0.795 0.805 0.802 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2007-2011 
Table 3A: Growth Rate of Unemployment Rate (15-64) by Quarter, 2010/2011 
  
4th Quarter 
2010/1st Quarter 
2011 
1st-2nd Quarter 
2011 
2nd-3rd Quarter 
2011 
3rd-4th Quarter 
2011 
Male 74.5% -3.4% 1.2% 5.7% 
Female -10.5% 5.6% 3.4% 2.3% 
Total 25.0% 0.0% 2.6% 4.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2010-2011 
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Table 4A: Unemployment Rate by Gender and by Age Group, 2007-2011 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
15-19 Male 0.112 0.126 0.111 0.098 0.171 
 
Female 0.363 0.468 0.494 0.480 0.389 
  Total 0.174 0.200 0.198 0.178 0.214 
20-24 Male 0.182 0.169 0.155 0.162 0.239 
 
Female 0.451 0.520 0.534 0.556 0.525 
  Total 0.255 0.254 0.251 0.272 0.313 
25-29 Male 0.111 0.086 0.083 0.065 0.123 
 
Female 0.303 0.258 0.286 0.339 0.294 
  Total 0.160 0.127 0.134 0.131 0.165 
30-34 Male 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.058 
 
Female 0.135 0.100 0.121 0.199 0.187 
  Total 0.054 0.041 0.047 0.061 0.088 
35-39 Male 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.045 
 
Female 0.063 0.040 0.038 0.051 0.072 
  Total 0.022 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.052 
40-49 Male 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.033 
 
Female 0.009 0.008 0.042 0.038 0.114 
  Total 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.021 0.055 
50-59 Male 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.020 
 
Female 0.000 0.001 0.045 0.011 0.012 
  Total 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.018 
60-64 Male 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 
 
Female 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 
  Total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.013 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2010-2011 
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Table 5A: Growth Rate of Unemployment Rate by Gender and by Age Group, 2007-2011 
    2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2007/2011 
15-19 Male 13% -12% -12% 74% 53% 
 
Female 29% 6% -3% -19% 7% 
  Total 15% -1% -10% 20% 23% 
20-24 Male -7% -8% 5% 48% 31% 
 
Female 15% 3% 4% -6% 16% 
  Total 0% -1% 8% 15% 23% 
25-29 Male -23% -3% -22% 89% 11% 
 
Female -15% 11% 19% -13% 11% 
  Total -21% 6% -2% 26% 3% 
30-34 Male -18% -4% 0% 164% 107% 
 
Female -26% 21% 64% -6% 39% 
  Total -24% 15% 30% 44% 63% 
35-64 Male -25% 0% 233% 220% 700% 
 
Female -36% 200% -19% 121% 241% 
  Total -25% 117% 15% 187% 438% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2010-2011 
Table 6A: Size and Growth Rate of Unemployment Size (15-64), 2007-2011 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Unemployment 
Size 
Male 1095189 1049042 962111 978604 1813075 
Female 1111115 1061789 1276352 1404868 1380685 
Total 2206303 2110831 2238463 2383472 3193760 
  2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2007/2011 
 Male -4.2% -8.3% 1.7% 85.3% 65.5% 
Growth Rate of 
Unemployment 
Size 
Female -4.4% 20.2% 10.1% -1.7% 24.3% 
Total -4.3% 6.0% 6.5% 34.0% 44.8% 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Distribution of 
Unemployment 
Size by Gender Male 49.6% 49.7% 43.0% 41.1% 56.8% 
 Female 50.4% 50.3% 57.0% 58.9% 43.2% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFSS 2010-2011 
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Structure of the survey 
  
First-step: interviews with a random sample of young people aged 18-35. Sample size is not pre-
determined. Interviews were carried out until 468 cases (i.e. persons considering migration) were 
found.  
Objective: selecting cases and controls  
 Data collected: basic characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Second-step: interviews with 468 cases and 468 controls 
Objective: identifying the drivers of migration 
 Data collected: all characteristics at individual / household / community levels that are assumed to be 
linked with the decision to migrate 
 
  
 
 
Third-step: interviews with 468 cases 
Objective: anticipating the nature of migration in the coming years 
Data collected: migration strategies, expectations from migration, etc. 
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